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(

This thesis is an attempt to put together the history of Al-Hijaz,
and to present a description of the political situation during the
period from the year 1520 through the year 1632.

The period starts

three years after the submission of Sharif Barakat II of Mecca to the
new Islamic power, the Ottomans.

And it concludes with the restor

ation of onter in Mecca in 1632.
In deciding to select this topic, I was inspired by the lack of
a complete history of the Holy Lands during the period t the importance
of the period, and the fact that most authors who dealt with the area,
during or after the period, took sides either with the Ottomans or the
Ashrafs of Mecca.
In looking for sources, I was unfortunate because I could not
find any Ottoman Farman of the period, but I think the other sources,
primary and secondary, helped me a lot, and without hesitation I could

recommend some of them to any interested student of the area or the
period:
A) Primary sources:

1) Mana;zih AI-Karam Fi Akhbar Makkah Wa

Wullat Al-Haram by Taj AI-Din AI-Khatib; 2) Smitt Al-Nojoum Al-rAwali
Fi Anba' AI-Awa'il Wa Al-Tawali by Alxiulmalik Al-Makki, and 3) Tariltll
Makkah by Ahmad Al-Siba I i.

Although this is not a primary source, the

valuable infonnation contained in it qualifies it to be on the same
level as the above two.
B) Secondary sources:

George Stripling; 2) Bulers
Port~guese

1) The ottoman Turks and the Arabs by
o:L~.l3SS.A

by Gerald De Gaury, and 3)

'rh~

of the S. Arabian Coast by Robert Serjeant.

The conclusions of this thesis could be summarized by the follow
ing:
A) The continuous attempts by the Ashrafs of Mecca to establish

a kingdom Oy sending expeditions into areas that the Ottomans were less
interested in.
E) The unwise Ottoman and local administrations of the area which

did not help to develop or improve conditions of Al-Hijaz.
C) The constant use of the word Islam by many figures in order to

achieve their goals.
D) The important role that the Ottomans played in clearing the

Red Sea.
E) The weak Ottoman policy in the Persian Gulf and the Indian
Ocean, which left the S. Arabian coast an easy target for European
nations later.
F) Finally, the role of the Ashrafs in causing disturbances by
the constant fighting among themselves which led to casualties and
foreign intervention.
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,CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This thesis is an attempt to put together the history' of Al-Hijaz
frarl the year 1520 to 1632, in a chronological order. . The paper covers
Al-Hijaz since the Sharif of Mecca, Barakat II, declared his loyalty to
the Ottomans after their conquest of Egypt in 1517. up to the year 1632"
when

Sh~rif

Zaid took over the Sharifate in Mecca.

The ,writer of this thesis became lnterested In attEmpting to write
a history of Al-Hijaz because of the following factors:
A) The books that were written about Al-Hijaz fell into the fol
lowing categories:

1) books that dealt only with geography;

that described religious sites and rites or ceremonies:
dealt with the political situation;

2) books

3) books that

4) very few books that tried to

give a complete picture by treating all aspects of life, and 5) non
Arabic books which dealt with Ai-Hijaz in their attempts to discuss
the 'Ottoman Einpire, but did not go into enough detail because at the
time of their writing, the interest was directed" toward tbe Ottoman West,
rather than the Ottoman East.
B) The Arab lands' were passing through their dark ages.
due to the following factors:

This was

1) the non-Arab rulers" whose main

interest was to keep their thrones as long as possible, without paying
attention to theil" subjects r conditions;

2)· the Europeans attEmpts

t

represented first by the Portuguese, to stop the advanceS of the Islamic
forces, and to strangle thEm, by every available means, and 3) the new

2

masters, the Ottomans, also forgot about their Arab subjects and paid
more attention to their European and Persian frontiers, and thus con
tributed heavily to the setback of the

Arabic~d

Islaroic civili7,a

tions~

In my attempts to find good primary sources, I was fortunate to
find a few handwritten sources that were
period, or some years after'it.

~itherwritten

during the

However, I could not find certain

other prlmary sources that were mentioned in some of the books.

I was

unable to find in Saudi Arabia any ottoman Farman (decrees) that dealt
with AI-Hijaz during the period.

In most of the sources, primary o'r

secondary, the authors used Farman of later periods as models for the
earlier ones.
In discussing the sources, there are sone sources that are worth
mentioning and describing, such as:

1) !arikll.11_a~K~h. by Ahmad Al-Siba Ii.

Although it is not a primary source, it is one of the leading printed
books t,hat treated the subject completely by giving the reader a clear,
but not detailed political, historical, economical, social and religious
picture.

The book was supported by a valuable list of prlmary sources.

2) 1i~lla.~A .A~-Kar~Ji ..A~h~<!!!Jl~<.k§!:.h·Ha-1TullC?-..:LAl'-Hat§1!!l by Taj
AI-Din AI-Khatib.

It is one of the leading primary sources which deals

with Mecca since the early time, and ends in the year 1125 H, the year
in which the author died.

The book, which is unprinted, goes into de

tail discussing the sixteenth and seventeenth century political picture
in Mecca.

:3) ~it ~ _Al-~.9..1ounL.A1- ~Aw~!.i fiAnba I Al ~!l!.a f il Wa A1-t~~.§:.~i by
Abdulmalik Al-Makki.

It is one of the leading prmted primary sources

that deals with the hiBtor.y of Mecca, and goes into more detail than the

J
book by Taj Al-Din AI-Khatib.
4) 'J,'he Ottoman Turks and the Arabs by George' Stripling.

It is one

of the leading non-:Arabic books that deals with the Ottomans and Arab
lands, including Al-Hijaz.

The book deals also with commerce and the

struggle in the Red Sea, and uses some of the' primary sources that are
mentioned in the bibliography of this thesis •

. 5) The Portuguese of the S. Arabian Coast by Robert Serjeant.

It

deals with the Portuguese activities in the East, as well as in the Red
Sea.

And it gives a good description of the Portuguese attack on Jeddah,

which he quoted from the Chronology of Al-Haddrami.

6) Rulers of Mecca by Gerald De Gaury.

The author presents to the

reader'the history of Mecca fran its foundation' up to the year 1881.
also includes pictures of some of the local customs and rites.

It

The

author's bibliography included some Arabic primary sources which he
used by having a certain Arab employee at the British Embassy in Baghdad
translate them into English.

The author showed an unfavorable attitude

toward the Turks, but this attitude could be the result of the fact that
the author fougbt the Turks during 'W'orld War I, as

a British

officer.

In reading this paper, the reader will. find it mostly dealing with

.

the history of Mecca and Medina, because the history of Al-Hijaz is so
much tied to the history of the two holiest cities of Islam.

As is men

tioned before, the thesis is 'an attempt to put together the internal
histor,y of Al-Hijaz, and it will also treat the Portuguese threat in
the Red Sea during the early part of the period.

The paper will include

some maps and illustrations that are needed to clarit,y the subject.

GHAPTER II
AL-HIJAZ'

I.

GEOGRAPHY

Al-Hijaz oooupies most of' the western part of the present Kingdom .
of Saudi Arabia.

It runs along the' eastern ooast· of the Red Sea.

Al

Hijaz oonsistf? of. two zones, a ooastal plain, and a mountain area whioh
are separated by the steep westem slopes of the mountains.
The Arab geographers differed on where the name ttAl-Hijaz" oame
from, but the most reasonable ..t heory is the one that states that the
name oomes from the Arabio word IIHajiz tf , whioh means barrier.

Judging

from itsgeographioalpoistion, Al-Hijaz is aotually a barrier between
Syria and Yanen, and between the Red Sea and the Highlands of Nejd.
Al-~Hijaz

is the spiritual oenter for all Muslims in the world be

oause it wa.s the home of Prophet Mohamad.

It is where he was born,

where he received the revelation from God, and where he was buried.

It

.

also contains the two holiest cities of Islam, Meooa and Medina.
-

II.

PEOPLE

Most of its population are of theSunni division.

I was unable to

find any infonnation oonoerning the number of the population of Al-Hijaz
during the period we are oonoerned with.

Although it may be possible

to get the needed information fran the tax records, unfortunately it was
inipossible tor me because they are located in Istanbul, Turkey.

5
The population was divided into two groups, the city people and the
tribesmen.

The city people were settled in established towns and took

up such professions as merchants, carpenters, and other small profes
sions.

The tribesmen were the majority, and more influentual.

All

through the history of the Arabs, we see the tribes associateci with the
political pattern of each Arab country.

However, they had their own

political pattern wh ich continued up to the present time.

They were al

ways. sources of trouble, and paid loyalty only to their Sbaykhs.

They

would revolt if their interests clashed with that of the ruler, or if
the ruler stopped or delayed their traditional payments, which were used
to keep them quiet am under control.

Their revolts caused casualties

in lives and properties to the city population, and most important to
the pilgrims.

More than half of the tribes of AI-Hijaz are related to

the big and important tribe of Harb or its allies.
III.n1:PORrANT TGJNS
Me~a_. (Mak~al?-)is

located on the steep western slopes of the moun

tainsin a narrow and deep valley.

The hills and mountains around it

provided Mecca with natural protection.

This city was the birthplace

of Prophet Mohamad, and it contains the Great Mosque and the sacred Al
Ka 1 ba.

A Turkish fortress is located on the Mountain of Qubais.

During

the .period of this paper, Mecca was the center of power in AI-Hijaz, be
cau'se'the Sharif. resided in it.
Me~in~a~in~g) is the second holiest city in Islam because

contains the grave of the Prophet and his mOSiue.

it

Medina served as the

capital of the Prophet and his first three CUSSCSSOr5.

In 1539, the

ottoman Sultan Suliman (the Magnificent) ordered the building of its

6
wall to protect it from triba,l attacks •
. J_edc!~~ was established by the Caliph 'Uthman 1 m 647 AD, and soon

became the port of. Mecca.

Withm Jeddah, there is a grave believed to

be the grave of Eve t the· mother of all human bemgs.
I.~i£:

is· one of the oldest towns in the Arabian Peninsula.

the headquarters for the armies of Al-Hijaz governments.

It was

The Ottomans

built its lvall in 1 799, and used to jail some of· their political prison

ers, such as the famous Medhat Pasha, m its fortress.
Yunbu' is the natural port of Medma, and it was from it that in

---

1200, Sharif Qitadah Bm Idris led an ar,my to occupy Mecca, and to

. establish the second Emirate of A1-Ashraf.

In 1666, a group of its

Ashrafs left for Morocco to establish the present ruling dynasty.

Ihr':'

ing the period we are concerned with, rebellious Ashrafs would leave
Mecca to take refuge m 'YUnbu'.

1. Abdul-Qudus Al-Ansari, Ta;:ikh tl,edc!!b. (Jeddah, saudi Arabia:
1382 H), p. 7.

ClIAPTER III

HISTORrCAL BACKGROUND
I.

THE PERIOD FRCM 610-1200 AD

Before 610, ,the Arabian Peninsula never enjoyed having a strong
united government.

But by the year 632, when Prophet Mohamad died, the

Arabian Peninsula was united under the control of the Prophet.

His

death was followed by a civil war, ignited by tribal ambitions, but the
first

O~hodox

Caliph, Abu-Bakr, succeeded in restoring law and order.

Under the first three orthodox Caliphs, Abu-Bakr, 'Omar and
'Uthman,who kept Medina as a capital, the Muslims conquered a vast
area, which brought great wealth back to Al-Hijaz.
caused Al-Hijaz to lose its, best men.

But those conquests

The disturbances toward the end

of f!uthman I s' period led to his murder, and the new Caliph, 'Ali, felt
that Kufa in Iraq would be a safer capital for his struggle against the
, Umayads in Syria.

A few years later, 'Ali was killed and the Umayad

M:u 'awiyah was proclaimed as the new Caliph in Daplascus :in 660. AD.

By

changing the capital from Medina to Kufa, and later to Damascus, Al-Hijaz
lost its political power and kept its religious influence only.
This was a period of no significant political and commercial im
portance, and or increased isolation and disorder in Al-Hijaz.

Mecca

enjoyed sanctity, but had to depend on the annual pilgrimage for its
prosperity, and on Egypt for its food supplies.

Medina was less sacred,

but was involved in a rivalry with Mecca, because it was nearer to the

8
'capitals, Damascus, Baghdad and Cairo.

This made it a more suitable

residence for the caliph 1 s governor than Mecca.
Mecca became ,the center'for learning, and the retreat of discon
tented ,men who did not like'the Umayads secular government.

In 692, the

Umayad General Al-Hajaj besieged Mecca, and bombarded Al-Ka 'ba, using
catapults.

The coming of I Abbasids brought more prestige to Mecca and

Medina because of the religious policy of the new dynasty. ' The 'Abbasids
sent more"money and separate governors to Mecca and Medina; however, re
volts contmued.
'Ali I S descendants, who were numerous, and who had great influence
in Mecca, 11edina and Yunbu', "VTere opposed to 'any authority, but theirs,
but they could not aeree among thems e.lves.

They were favored by the

",

beduins because they were the' descendants of Husayn and Hasarl, the grand - '
sons of PropherMohamad.As the caliphate declined, their power in
creased.

Their policy vTas to playoff the Caliphates against each

other, and to have good relations with the rulers of Yemen.
who were descendants of

'Al~ls

son

Al~Hasan,

The Hasanids

took control of Mecca,

while the Husaynids, the descendants of 'Ali I S second son, Al-Husayn,
were in control of Medina.
In 930, the Shi'i Qaramittah sacked Mecca and carried a'\vay the
sacred Black stone, Which they returned in

950.

In 950, the Hasanid

Sharif Ja r far Al-r-Iousawi attacked Mecca, established the first Sharifid
Ei'nirite and kept good relations with the Fatimids.

In 1011, Ja' far IS

sari Abu AlFutuh 2 had a quarrel with the fanatic Fatimid Caliph Al-Ha~{im,
so' he declared himself a Caliph, but later he and his successors de
, 2Ahrnad Al-Siba'i,
n. 209.

1;~~!.~ll.M~~kall (Mecca, Saudi Arabia: 1372 H),

9
clared their loyalty to the
Since 1061, a

~.::trur:ele

I

Abbasid Caliuhate.
bctil'Teen the Housa't·rids and. thE) HU3c.:mid s I

Al-Fatikis led to the seizure of Al-Ka"ba r 5 treasures by the Shtlibis,
Al~Ka'bars

.the hereditarY keepers of

keys.

This led to the interven

tion of theYe.mcn ruler, 'Ali Al-Sulaihi), who,appointed Abu-Hashim
Nuhamad as the new Sharif.

After Abu Hashim r s death, the Ashrafs

struggled among themselves, which led to disorder, plundering thn pil
grims; imposinE heavy taxes on pile;rims whose rulers could not protect
them, and the looting of Mecca by the tribe of Hudhail.
In 1174, the Ayoubid Turan visited Mecca and aopointed a Hasanid
to the

Sharif~te

of Mecca, and replaced the Zaidi Shi1i rite with the

Sunni .Shafi Ii.
1>.

To .sUIlUllarize, this .was a period in which AI-Hijaz enjoyed

~jtabil-

ity during the first forty years, but suffered from contiriuous revolts,
either by the Ashrafs or the tribes, during the rest of the period.

It

was a period that saw interventions by outsiders, either to calm thines
doWn, or to impose their

Ovffi

men as the Sharifs.

Caliphates continued sending money and
and Medina.

However, the different

supplie~

to the people of Mecca

By having the Sharifs declare their loyalty to them and

.

mention their names as protectors of Islam in AI-Khuttba, a relieious
speech preceeding the Friday prayer, and at the end of it, the speaker
thanks the ruler and calls upon God to help him.
II.

THE PERIOD FROM 1200-1520

In the year 1200, the Ashrafs of Yl.U1bu I , led by Qitada, "mo lias

Jrb id ., n. 211.

10

'disoleased with the uolicy of his relatives in Mecca, attacked Mecca and
est.c1.blished the second Sharifid Enir.ite.
relations with both the

I

At the beginning he had eood

Abbasid:s and Ayoubids, but later he caused

trouble 't-Tiththe r Abbasids.

In the year 1212,Qitada did not receive

the Ayoubid Caliph Al-'Adil well, which made

Al~'Adil

angry

~t

Qitada.

In Al-Hijaz itself, Qitada extended his rule over the whole area
except for Medina whose Husaynids ruler refused to submit, and foueht
Qitada several times.

The-_historians 4 differed on "Whether Qitada vTon

Medina, but it seems that he did not since the Husaynids continued to
i'rule J.Tedina for several years after Qitada 1 s death, which came at the
hands of his son Hasan in the year 1220.
Hasan faced trouble from his brother Ragih, who conspired with the
•Abbasids, but Hasan defeated the 'Abbasids and his brother who fled to
the Ayoubid ruler of Yemen, Mas'oud.

In 1221, Mas'oud attacked Mecca,

sacked it and appointed one of his generals as the governor.

Hasan fled

to the desert and tried to recover Mecca the following year., But he
failed and fled to Baghdad, where he died.
From 1222 until 1249, Mecca was the victim of continued war be
t'VJeen the Ayoubids of Yemen, and the Ayoubidsof Egypt.

During that,

period, the rule in l-tecca clFnged eight times, and with the change of
rule, the governors changed, and the population, suff,ered the most.

In

1225, the HusaynidQasim of Medina tried to recover Mecca, but he could
no't.'
In 1250, the Mamluks deposed the Ayoubids in Egypt.
Mogols led by Hulagu, took Baghdad and destroyed the

4rb~~.~ p. 213.

f

In 1258,

Abbasids there.

11

The ~tamluks invited the remaining •Abbas ids to Cairo to gain more reli
gious influence.

In Mecca, Qitada' s des,cendants kept fighting amone

themselves, while the Husaynids controlled Medina.
In 12,54, the Sharif of Mecca was .Ghanlm, the grandson of Qitada.
But his rule did not last long because his COUSln Idris and Sharif Abu
Noumi I, attacked Mecca and ruled it together•. ' In 1257, Abu Noumi,I
became the sole ruler, after he had a quarrel with .his uncle, Idcis,
'Who fled the city and kept bothering h:im until he was killed.
In 1260, t~e Mamluk Sultan Baibars made the pilgrlmage to Mecca,
and decided· to leave theintemalaffairs of Al-Hijaz in' the hands of
Abu Noumi I, because of his finnness.

However, his long period (12.54

1301 ') was marked with wars with the rulers of Medlna, who in 1284 forced
him to leave Mecca.
after a short period.

Iht he .succeeded in regaining control of the city
He also imposed high taxes on the pilgrims; it

is reported that he asked for thirty dirhams from each pilgrim.

His

wars with the rulers of 1'1edina caused his relation with the .Mamluks ,to
become. bad, so in 1291, he declared loyalty to the Yemeni ruler, and
started mentioning his harne in Al-Khuttba until he died in 1301 •
Following his death, his sons fought among themselves until his
grandson

r Ajlan

until 1375.

finally took control of the Shar1fate In 1346, . and ruled

However, his period was marked by political un rests , which

bothered the Mamluk Sultan, Who swore to extenninate all of the Ashrafs. 5
He introduced the system of appointing his son and the future successor
as a co-regent, \..h'Op1ng that this move could help to avoid family strug
gle before or after his death •
.5.tbid.

f

p. 215.

12
His successor, Hasan, tried successfully to extend his rule over
all of Al-Hijaz, but had to try to avoid causing the interference of
his Mamluk master in Egypt.

In

1425, the Mamluks took charge of the

customs in Jeddah, and ma:intained a small garrison at Mecca.

The ap

pointments of his successors bad to be confirmed by the Mamluk SUltans.
The period of Mohamad Bin Barakat I

(1455-1496) ' was a period of stabil

ity because of his strong personality, and his ability to deal firmly
with the tribes.
In its tum, the stability caused prosperity in AI-Hijaz.
, his death, the Mamluk Sultan Kaitby appointed his son, Barakat
the new Sharif.

Arter'

n,

as

But soon Ba'rakat II faced opposition from his brothers

Haza I and Ahamad AI-Jazani,t who succeeded in forcing Barakat to leave
Mecca.

Barakat II stayed in, jeddah, and returned to Mecca with Amir

AI-Haj Al-Masri (the prince, or the leader of the Egyptian pilgrims).
He exiled his brother Haza ' to Yuribu', but the latter gathered an army,
defeated Barakat who had' to flee to AI-Laith.
When Haza I died, Barakat returned to Mecca in time to receive
from the Mamluk SUltan the Khul'ah (a cloak given ,by the SUltan to con
firm the Sharif's appointment).

Barakat had to accompany the Egyptian

'pilgrims to Yunbu I because ,his brother Al-Jazani, looted the Syrian pil
grlms~

The war continued between the two brothers, and Mecca changed

hands between them.
In

1502, an Egyptian force arrived and forced Al-Jazani to leave

Mecca to his brother Barakat.

However, Barakat hesitated to receive

the 'Egyptian commander, who, arrested Barakat.

The commander took a

bribe from Al-Jazani in order to support his rule in Mecca, and Barakat
was taken to Egypt in chains.
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Upon his arrival irl Egypt, he was welcomed and supported by the
•Ulama there, until 1503 when he hear¢! the news of Al-Jazani' s assassi
nation.

He set out for Mecca, and the new Sharif, his brother Humaiddah,

.fled the city when he heard of Barakat's advance.

Barakat proclaimed

himself the ruler of Al-Hijaz, and appointed his brother Kaitby and son
t

Ali as the co-governors of Mecca •
. At that time, the Muslims faced a new danger, represented by the

Portuguese, who wf!l:re threatenipg the Muslims t control of the Red Sea.
The threat and the struggle that followed will be dealt with in a
separate chapter later.
The threat to Jeddah forced the Mamluk SUltan Al-Ghouri to order
the building of a fleet in Suez in 1506.

The ottoman SUltan. Bayazid

sent wood and men to help in building the.f1eet.

Later the fleet was

. sent into the Red :3ea to counter the Portuguese threat.

The Commander

Husayn Al-Kurdi arrived in Jeddah, and decided to build a wall to pro
tect it.

He ordered every able man to work, and ordered the demolish

ing of many houses to use their materials in building the wall.

The

wall was tinishedin less than a year, but the Portuguese. main attack
did not come until 1541.
In 1517, the Ottomans, who became the strongest Islamic power
at that time, were led by Sultan Salim I.

He defeated the Mamluks,

conquered Syria and Egypt, and declared AI-Hijaz as part of the Ottoman
Empire.

Sharif Barakat II did not hesitate to send his son Abu Noumi II

to Egypt, to declare his loyalty to the new master.
rece~ved

Sultan Salim I

hm well and confimed his' position in Al-Hijaz, with the

Sharif I s acknowled grnent of the Ottoman supremacy.
S1arif· Barakat ordered the mentioning of the name of the Ottoman
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Sultan.1n Al-Khuthah. and tricked the Mamluk Commander Husayn AI-Kurdi
into coming. to Mecca.

He executed him, but some of the Mamluks fled to

Yemen, where they caused sane trouble for the ottomans.

Sultan Salim I

sent Husayn AI-Rumi CAl-Rais) as his representative in Jeddah •.

II.

CHAPTER IV
THE OTT(}1AN AIMINISTRATION
SIXTEENTH CENTURY

According to the regulations of the Muslim state, the Ottoman
Sultan was the absolute ruler, and was l1lnited only by religious tenets.
To administer his buge empire, the Sultan was assisted by the men in
his Diwan (cabinet), who bore the title of Pasha, and who were headed
by a Grand. Vizir (Prime Minister).

The treasury ot the empire was left

in charge of the two Derteroars (treasurers) ,of Rume1ia and Anato1ia,
".

aided in the Arab lands by one of the lower rank residing at Aleppo.
The

j~dicia1

system was headed by the two Kazieskersot Rume1ia and

Anato1ia, who received appeals and appointed all judges.

The local

judges ot cities and towns were cal1edKadis,while the judges of vil
1ages were called Na l ibs, and the local· authority controlled their
appointments.

The law was enforced by Muhtasibs, who were given soldiers

to do so •.
The administration of the state was organized in a military
fashion, and rested on a system that resembled European feudalism, with
the. exc~ption that "in the Turkish plan homage was not pIedged" 6 •

The

sons of the vassals were not pennitted to' inherit their fathers I hold
ings, except under certain conditions.

The administrators rose through

. the military ranks to hold administrative pOSitions.
6George Stripling,
1942), p~60.

'!l!.e

Ottoman Turks 8}!.d the ~Ara~ (Illinois, USA:
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I.

THE GENERAL

OTT~AN

AOONISTRATICW OF PROVINCES

Upon conquering a province, the Ottoman amy would move in, and
with it came land registrars who would count the towns and village s in
that province.

They divided them into fiefs in the. following way:

1) small fiefs for the fighting soldeirsi

2} a number of large fiefs

for the princes and generals, and 3) a number of large fiefs for the
Sultan.

However, the system of fiefs was not used in Egypt and Al-Hijaz.

"This system did not mean that the vassal would be the owner of
all lands and villages in his fief"?, but he had the right to collect
taxes from the owners in his fief.

He also had to be ready to answer

the SUltan's call for military campaigns by preparing an army whos e
".

number of soldiers was detennined the following was:
each 5,000 Akce.

one soldier for

So if the f~ef production was 10,000 Akce, it would

have to prepare two soldiers.
The fiefs we re divided into the folloi·rin::;: 1) TiJ-nar: small
fief whose production was less than 20,000 Akce.
amat:
larger than the TiInar and its production was between 20 t 660:
100,000 Akce. 3)~: A larger fief whose production was
more than 100,000 Akce. 8

--i,--za'

The provinces were divided politically and militarily into "Iyalat"

.

with each IIIyalah"· divided into tlAlwiyatlt or nSanjaksU and each "Liwa"
had a number o'ir Timars and Za' amats.

Each Itlyalah" was ruled by a'

Pasha called "Bikr Biki II, which means the Bek of Al-Bakawat.
military rank was

I~ir

Miran" ,wilic means Amir ul-Umara.

And his

Each "Liwa"

.7Satti ' Al-Husari, ~.:!!i..l.~d Al-' Arabi~ ~':a Al-Dowleh AI:.
IUtht!J~n~'tl ( Beirut, Lebanon: 1965) ,p. 29. .

8

.

Ib~,.9..,

p. 30.
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was ruled by a Bek called "Sinjak Bek", which means Bek Liwa, and his
military rank was 'rr.lir Liwa", 'Which means Amir Liwa.
The Ottomans lei't the political and military powers of the pro
vinces in the hands of the governor who was assisted by judges to ad
ministrate justice, and a treasurer to

~ke

oharge of taxes and other

financial functions.
Generally, the tribes were left out of the administratj,le arrange
ments.

With few exceptions, tribes were given fiefs to control and

Whom to 'collect', taxes.

f~

The tribes were administrated through their

Shaykhs and Princes, 'Whose authorities the Porte recognized.

Each

S1aykh had to get the Porte r s approval upon taking over in his tribe.
tiThe popul~tion of the following areas were not asked to serve in
"

the amy:

(1) Constantinop~e, (2) Crete, (3) Islands of'the Mediter

ranean Sea, (4) Tripoli, (5) Yem:en~ (6) Al-Hijaz .,,9

n.

THE OTTCJv!AN POLICY IN ARAB LANDS

The Ottoman SUItans did not rule or administrate the Arab lands
directly, but they appointed a Wali for each province (Wilayah), except
for AI-Hijaz, 'tmich 't-vas treated differently because of its $ensitive

~l'he '1ialis had unljmited auth~rity in their pro

religious position.

vinces, and were only :interested :in being on good tenus with the SUltan
and the high cfficials in Constantinople.
The term of each Wali was one year, after which the Wali could be
dismissed and returned to his horoe town, appo:inted to another office, or
his tenn renewed.

The short tem did not help to improve the conditions

9Ibid ., p. 251
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of tho i')rovincc, since the Wali' s interezt would be to eet richer before
his' termexnired, or he was dismissed by the Sultan.
Each Wali had a court consisting of 'Ulama, high judge,
nobels and the army officers.

trea3U~Gr,

The latter group interfered a lot in the

affairs of the "province t cau:sing disturbances, and sometimes revoltine
against the Wali.
The Ottoman policy was never to interfere in the people's life and
customs,

unle~s

ttwas necessary, and as long as the

~ubjects

stayed

. lOYBJ. to th e SUltan and paid th e ~axe s.

It is no doubt that the Ottoman r s policy had two sides.

It helped

the Arabs to keep their nationality and social and economic customs.

It

also gave freedom for each professional group to arrange and protect its
interests.

The policy also limited the function of the provincial gov

ernment to collecting taxes and protecting the provinces, and never
paid attention to other government functions such as education, economy,
connnerce and health.

The Ottoman' s policy of isolating the provinces

from influence by the ideas of the European Renaissance 'forced the sub
jects many years backwaro.
III.

THE OTTCMANADMINISTRATION OF

~-HlJAZ

Al-Hijaz enjoyed greater autonamy than the other conquered Arab
lands under the Ottomans ,who upon defeating the Mamluks in 1517 re
ceived the Sharif of Mecca 1 s acceptance of their superiority, and in re
turn, .the Ottoman Sultan Salim I kel;>t him in

h~s

office and oromised to

keep the Sharifate in his family.
~O~:At.;'C.5.

J.n..J!.l_,:"Hii~~.

During the period we are concerned with, four
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grouos Hith different interests played a role in determining the nolitics
of AI-Hija 7..
Sha.r.:il Q,f.

H.~_q.9_~,

a Hasan ide , was considered the ruler of all of .

Al-Hijaz, with the seat of his Sharifate in
his rule.

}~ecca,and

with}ledina under

After the death of a Sharif, the Ashrafs would elect a Sharif

to assume the responsibilities and the new Sharif had to write to the
Sultan to get his Khul l a and Fannan of approval, which was to be read
publicly in the Great Mosque.
The Sharif had to please and serve the interests of some grouns
such as the ottoman officials,. the'Shaykhs of the tribes, and the· Ash
rafs.

In attempting to do so, some Ashrafs were forced out by one of

the groups, or by an alliance of two of them.

In his attempts to secure

his position, the Sharif of Mecca, as well as some of the influential
Ashrafs had their

01in

armies of slaves recruited mostly from Africa.

At the beginning, the Sharif enjoyed a free hand in dealing vTith
the affairs of his Sharifate, and had only to deal with· two Turkish
officials~

a

jud~e

and Muhtasib.

He also enjoyed great income from re

ceiving half of the custom dues of the port of Jeddah, but constant
collision over the mentioned customs forced the SuItan to appoint a
Turk to the nevT office of Shaykh AI-Harm Al-Makki, which worsened rela
tions more •
tions

w~th

However, the ottoman Sultans tried to improve their rela
the Sharif and somet:imes ruled in favor of the Sharif in his

disputes with Turkish officials.
$h.C3.rif

Q.fJ1~Q.~~,

by. the Sharif. of !-1'ecoa.

a Husaynid, was confinnedin his appointment
However, both Sharifs had nominal authority in

Medina, beoause "the real authority was in the hands of Shaykh Haram
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Al'-}!.1dani, who was supposedly a Turkish 'Al:im. n1 0
'J1l_~_T}!Z:~.~}'-.1!..9_:rtl:.ci~Js ':interest

was to assert the Turkish author-

i ty, and to check the authority of the
Turkish officials 'torero:

:~'harif.

Among the :important

1) \\}'ali of Jeddah, the first Ottoman official

to be appomt'ed in Al-Hijaz, and tlhe resided in Jeddah which became the
seat oftllyalat Al-Habash u11, which mciluded some ports on the African
Coast, such as Musawa ' and Sawakin.
tion of Iyalat Al-Habash at 180, 000
which

exped~tions

The Ottomans estimated the produc
Ak<;te~~,

and made Jeddah the base fran

,rere sent to Yemen and beyond.

The Turkish Wali re

ceived his orders from the Wali of Egypt, and was, assisted by the
Sharif of Mecca's representative who had nominal authority.

2) Shaykh Al-Haram Al-Makki, was the post created when disputes
m

~

,

creased between the Sharif and the Wali of Jeddah.

The official was

supposed to be a Turkish 'Alim wh,a resided in Jeddah.

The Shaykh' s job

was to be aspy on the Sharif, and to write directly to the Porte.

3) Shaykh
the

rea~

Al-H~ram

AI-Madani was a Turkish

I

Alim, who was actually

governor of Medina, and contacted the SUltan directly.

He was

supposed to be over sixty-three years old, and his salary was equal to
that of the' Grand Vizir. 12

Shaykh Al-HaramAl-Madani held a meeting

every Friday to discuss' problans. 13

, 4) Both ~udges of Mecca and Medina were supposed to be Turkish.
10Ahamd Al-Khiyari, 'r UlTl.?-...r!!.~.Jll-Madin~h Was H':lkamalL1i~ 'Ahd AI:.
Nowbo~![?.hJiatta AI-Y0.:9!l1 (}1edina, Saudi Arabia: 19620. 19.
11 Al-Husari,

cit.,
-_._
0'0.

p. 239 ..

,12Al -Khiyari• .2l2.. cit., p. 20.

13rbid., p. 20.

21

They served one year terms, after which they would be moved.

'5) The Muhtasib had to be Turkish.

The job of this official was

to enforce justice .. and to serve as a treasurer.
6) Other Turkish officials of less importance were the Turkish
representatives who assisted the Sharif' srepresentative's in small'
to'tms.
The day-to-day confrontation between the local Ashrafs and the
Turkish officials led to disturbances and disorders which will be dis
cussed in the chapter dealing with the chronology of the Ashrafs of
Mecca.
Th~ l.~iq~

and contained.
Generally,

th~

1-J'ere unlike the above groups which could be controlled

The tribes, however, were hard to control and please.
tribes consider

recognize any autho~ity.

·::'her.lse~ves

free men, and refused to

The Ottomans did not assign fiefs to the

tr.ibes of Al-Hijaz, as they did with some tribes 1n Syria and Iraq.
However, the tribes of Al-Hijaz had already established their own areas
of interest earlier.

They had control of the commercial routes, as well

as the pilgrimage routes.

Because of this control,and their contin

uous riads, the authority, Sharifit$i.. or Turkish, concluded agreements

.

.

with them to keep order, and to use their manpower in military cam
paigns.· '!he ottcmans and the Sharifs tried to please, the tribes with
payments, supplies and exemption from taxes.
government 1n Al-Hijaz (Sixteenth Centu:rx)

As :was shown above, the two

main authorities in AI-Hijaz were the Sharif of Mecca and the Turkish
officials, and both exercised their authority in the towns only while
the tribes l-rere in control of the desert and land routes.
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The functions' of

th~

government of Al-Hijaz were as follows:

1) Pilgrmage, the main function, and the most nnportant.

It was for

the government to protect the pilgms during the pilgrimage se.ason, to
make it easy for them to perform their religious duties and to provide
them with the needed supplies of food and water.

The most difficult

part was to protect the pilgrimS outside of towns from tribal attacks.
In order to do so, the government assigned guards to each pilgrimage
caravan, and established military posts on the pilgrimage routes.
2) Law and order, disturbances and disorders occured in towns
either by a cminal accident, or a fight between the slaves or men of
some Sharifs.

In the case of fights among the Ashrafs I men, lithe Sharif

of Mecca usually decided the punishment either by executing some of the
"

participants or expelling the accused Sharif to some areas such as
Jizan or. Yunbu I • II 14
In the case of criminal acts, the Turkish judges' administered the
justice, ol0iered the punishment, and ordered the Muhtasib to carry out
the punishment.
There is no record of an existance or a city police, except
for the Sharif's men who would tour the town. In keeping oroer
at night, it is reported that the people of each section of the
town organized guards called nWajaks ll to guC\rd against theives
and criminals. 1 .5
In order to keep order outside of towns, the government had to deal
with the tough tribes, and the only way to punish them was either to
master enough troops or to wait until the smnmer when the tribes usually
settle in their areas of control.
·14Al-Siba..i,
t
1 Ci...

.

t
2l2.~<!.l:._.,

"'Ibid., p. 280.

In order to protect the towns, walls

p.. 279 •
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werebu1lt, such as the wall of Medina, which Sultan Suliman ordered to
be buil,t in 1532.

It was completed in 19r3•

.) Health, education and welfare are the responsibilities of a
modern, or any responsible, government, ,it is clear.

However, the gov

ernment of Al-Hijaz played a small role, if any, in this area.

However,

this was the way earlier and later governments acted, until the twen
tieth century.
There is no record of hospitals or any governmental activities in
the field of hEtalth.

But records show that the' Ottomans established a

military hospital in Jizan toward the end of th.e seu:.enteenth century.
The annual pilgrimage .season was, and still is, a season of diseases be
cause of the diseases carried to the Holy lands by the pilgrims.

The

It,

only medic,ine was the one prescribed by the bedums, or the self-called
phySicians, 't-Thich did not help to improve the health situation.

"It is

reported that aiL knee disease appeared in Mecca in 1629-1630, and made
. some people unable to stand or to walk, and the local physicians pre
scribed lemon juice as a medicme for it. u16
There is no record of any kmd of a modern school system, but
records. show that

If

every mosque, large and small, 1:lad a primary or

reading school where pupils studied reading, writmg, Arabic and the
Koran. u17
IISome local Shaykhs established small schools called 'kuttab l
which taught the Satnle, subjects and other subjects, such as grammar,
16Ibid ., p. 252.
,17sydney Fisher~ Th.ELJ-iidc!le E~st (New York, New YOrk, USA: 1966),
.
.

p. 214.
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poetry and religious subjects." 18

The four sects of 'the Sunni division-

Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki and Shafi I i-- had regular meetines that were
held in the Great Mosque in Mecca, and the Prophet t s 'Mosque in Medina
to teach relir,ious subjects.
'In the area of llclfarc, the f,ovemment played a greater role than,
'in the arens of health and education.

Regular supplies were sent to the

people of Mecca and l-1edina, and money was sent to be distributed among,
the poor.

The ottomans paid attention to the problem of water in Hecca,

so 1'later 'VIas dug from nearby wells and springs.

In, ~ 543, Sultan S'ulima.n

AI-Qanuni (the 1·fagnificent) ordered the renewal of the Prophet's l·iosque
in

H~dina.

In 1575, Sultan Selim II ordered the renewal of the Great

'Hosque in Hecca.

In 1630, the .hard rain cau.sed damages to AI-Ka 'ba, so

Sultan 1v1uraci IV ordered the rebuilding of it.
To support, supply and finance the poeple of Mecca and Hedina,
there 't'lere two kinds of~vaqf.

1 )Awqaf AI-Haramin:

These were pro-pcr

ties in Egypt, as well as in other areas, that 't..rere made ,Avrqaf 'by the
Ottoman Sultan, and fran its incomes, the people of the two holy cities
were 'supported vTith goods and money.

2) Awqaf Ahliyah:

These t'lere

properties that were made Awqaf by some wealthy people to serve the
sarne purpose.
4) Defense was significant since the Ottomans paid great atten
tion to protecting the Holy lands, especially with the presence of the
Portu[;uese threat, 1.;hicl1 will be dealt '"''lith in a later cha.pter.

A

~ar-

rison uas stC:.tioned in Jeddah, and much later in Hecca and Nedina.
Ottoman fleet was very active and succeeded in clearing the Red Sea

_.

18Al...SibaJi, OD. cit.,
281.
-,-- p.
.
-~.-

The

25
from the Fortup;ucs c.
ling

fo~

The Sharif was able to gather a large amy by c:11

t.Tihad uhen the Portuguese threatened. Jeddah in

5) Economy' vTas ,bas~d on jmport.

1541.

Because of climatic reasons,

Al-Hljaz. is. not, and was not, known for its agricultural production.
It always had to import its bas1lc supplies from the outside.

Hecca de

nended completely on food supplies from Eeypt, while Medina was able to
satisfy the need of .its population by its

O'tlID

agricultural production.

After the Ottomans succeeded in making the Red Sea an Ottoman Lake, they
tried to encouraee trade through Jeddah by opening the 'Port to· Euronean
ships, on the condition that the ships never pass Jeddah, even if they
carried goods for Egypt,. and insisted on carrying those goods on ships
o'tmeci by Huslims only.
The sources of the revenue were the pilgrims, the customs of the
port in Jeddah, and the taxes.
any records in Arabia.
during the period.

Unfortunately, I was not able to locate

I was also unable to find any budget of Al-Rijaz

Rov/ever, the budget of Egypt of 1596-1597 provided

me with a long list of interesting articles that concern Al-Hijaz.
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The Purpose
1•

amount of
Paras

For the poor of Hecca and Medina

350,244

2.

For the 'expenditures of Mecca and Hedina

3.

For the customar,y payment to provide for expendi
tures of the leader of the Holy Pilgrimage (1005 H)

19 stanford Shaw',

1968), PD. 154-169.

'J:Jl(tJ!141L~LC?f Ott<?m'Yl~.i

1 ,731 ,253

400,000

(Paris. France:
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The

Purpose

lUTlount of
Para::>

4.

For the customary paymont to the messenger who brinp;s
the news of tho pil~rim 1 s departure fran the Hount of
, f Arafat
'

1 ,800

5.

For the cuntomary po.yment to provide for the banquet
of the leader of the Holy Pilgrimage when he comes
to Birket-ul Hac ( 1005 H)
,

14,000

6.

For the equi'l:lnent needed to guard the pilgrims while they
go and come at Birket-ul Hac, provided by Za J 1m of Cairo

1,600

7.

For the hire of camels to carry the money sent to
Abdul-Halim Efendi, judge of Medina

1, 61J·G

8.

For the hire of camels to carry the wheat sent as alms
and th'e money for the people of the Holy Cities

9.

For the hire of measures of the -ymeat sent as alrnsi by
the Sultan

4,000

10. For the o·ffering sent to Sb'arif Hasan, Emir of Mecca'

2,400

11. For the hire of camels to carry the money sent 'to
Sayid Rakim, :EJnir of Yunbu J, from Cairo to the port
of Suez

4,800

12. For the hire of camels along the road of the Holy Pilgrirnage in the name of the Ev.lad-i Azm (tribe) for the
years 1005-1006 H
1 J. For the customary payment to the guide's along the road of
the Holy Pilgrimage

320,210

~j74,

125;

.580

14. For the payment of freieht on the ship Gulgani under
·the captainship of· Mebmet Reis

13,400

i5.,For the price of wheat and barley for the Arab tribes
along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage, for the year
1005 H
.

20,500

16. For the customary payment to the emin and scribe in
charge of taking the money to the people of the Holy
Cities (Emin-i SUrre and Katib-i SUrre)
,

2,000

17. For the pric~ of bowls for the lamps in the sacred place
of ·worship

1,205

18. For the' pension of 1 Abdul Karim Semhude, who is Khatib
(preacher at Friday prayer) of Medina

3, 166
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'Toe Purpose

Amount of
Paras

19, For the hire of ~ tailor to sew the skins of the sable
robe sent to Sharif Hasan, Emir of Mecca

041

20. For the customary payment of the Commander (Serdar)
, of the men of Gonullus and Tufenkcian-i SUvTari Corps
and others (who' guard the pilgrimage) at thetfme of
the pilgrims departure
'

5,000

21. For the supplies and foods for the poor and indigent
(living) along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage, set
aside by order of the governor of Egypt

12,3CO

22. For the pension of the commanders of the sweepers
in Mecca

23,760

23. For the customary payment for Sharifs at the port of
Jeddah
24.

Fo~

the customary payment to provide provisions for
the.new ship assigned to carry the loads of the leader
of the Pilgrimage to Jeddab

400
24,600

25. For supplies for the chief of the sweepers in the
Prophet's Mosque

2,870

26. For the hire of camels to transport candles for the
Holy Cities and to transport the Holy Curtain

4,305

27. For equipment needed to arrange the well at the fort
Wejh on the road of the Pilgrimage
'

2,000

28. For the custoiuary payment to the Ashrafs of Bani
Husayn in Medina and for Beduins to keep security
of the road of the pilgrimage, and for the learned and
the orphans in the Holy Cities
29. For the customary payment to the tribe charged with
ke,eping security at the well of the fort of Wejh
30.

Fo~ the price of bees' wax to be sent to the Holy
Cities
'

197, 225

1 ,000
6,560

31. For the freight costs for the wheat alms sent by the
Sultan and for the rations for the peo~le of Mecca
(for the year 1003 H)

3,075

32; For'the tailor to sew the cloth and robes for,the Beduins
along the road of the Holy Pilgrimage

1,652
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The Purpose

Amount of
Paras

33. For supplies for the tent Beduins along the road of the
Holy Pilgrimage .

1.310

The above articles of the budget of Egypt .show something of what
the Ottoman govornrent ,~~'":c t.o send to AI-Hijaz. and it shows the vast

interest given to the people of Mecca and Medina, and to keeping order
on the roads of the pilgrimage.

As it was' indicated in the budget, most

of the articles were paid or sent customarily,;

CHAPTER V

THE RULERS OF AL-HIJAZ
1520-1632

The reader of this chapter on the rulers of, Al-Hijaz during 1520
1632 will notice that it is a chronology of the Ashrafs of Mecca.

The'

reason for that is that the Ottoman Sultans appointed them as rulers of
Al-Hijaz; with the exception of Jeddah, and they used Mecca as their
residence and seat of government.
I.

SHARIF BARAKAT II (1496-1.502, 1503-1524) ,

When the Ottoman Sultan Selim I (The Grim) conquered Egypt in

1517,

Shar~f

Barakat II was the Sharif of Mecca for twenty-one years,

disrupted only for a short period.

After entering Cairo, "Sultan

Selim I freed some Meccan nobles Who were imprisoned by the Mamluk
Sultan 'Al-Ghouri earlier u20 and '!\iras plarming to send an army to the
Arabi~ Peninsula to exPel the Mamluks from Al-Hijaz and Yemen .. 21 and

to

~ccupyMecca

.

and Medina so he could claim the title "Hami Al-Haramin lt

or the Defender of the Two Mosques.

But a Meccan judge named Salah

Al-Din Bin Zuhairah 22 , who was freed by~ltan Selim I from Al-Ghouri's
20Mohamad Anis,Al-Dowleh AllUthmaniyallWa AI-Mushrig AI-'Arabi

1514-1914 (Cairo, Egypt: 1923), p. 127
21 As'ad Ttla.s, Tarikh Al-Ummah Al-'Arabiyah (Beirut, Lebanon,:
1963), p. 131.
'
, 22Qutb Al-Din Al-Hanafi, Tarikh Makkah (Mecca, saudi Arabia:
1950 ), p. 241
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jail, told the Sultan that Sharif Barakat II would be glad to declare '
his loyalty to the Ottoman SUltan, and,the judge asked the SUltan 'to
write to the Sharif.
Sharif Barakat II heard the news of the fall of the Mamluksand
,received a letter from the victorious Ottoman Sultan, and another let
ter from the judge advising him to, join ,the Ottanans and to send his
son Abu-Noumi II to the Ottoman SuI tan in Cairo.
Sharif Barakat sent his thirteen year old son, Abu-Nomni II, to
Cairo "were he was well received and well treated by Sultan Selim I,
and was sent. back to l1ecCR as the co-ruler with his father." 2 )

SuItan

Selim I orclered that "half of the income of Mecca and Jeddah be paid
to the two Sharifsevery year". 24
, Sharif Barakat II received an order from SUltan Selim I to kill
the Mamluk Commander in Jeddah, Husayn Al-Kurdi, because of his illtreatment of the population of Jeddahwhile building the Wall of
Jeddah .• ' IISharif Barakat tricked Al-Kurdi into coming to Mecca where,

..

he,was captured and sent back to Jeddah where he was drowned in the
sea ...25
When the Ottoman representative arrived in Jeddah he found a large

.

number of armed ships arid an arsenal of arms which were left behind by
the Mamluks.

His mission was to expel the remaining Mamluks who fled

to Yemen, so he decided to follow them.

the

He obtained pennission from

Wali of Egypt, and also a promise of assistance from Sharif
.. 23Ib~d., p. 241.

24Taj AI-Dini Al-Khatib.• Manayih AI-Karam Fi Akhbar Makkah Wa
Wullat AI-Haram (Mecca, Saudi, Arabia: 1125 H), p. 51.
· ' op. C1
,·t . ,p.
,25An1S,

'127'•
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Barakat' II.

The Wali of Egypt appointed the merchant AI-Khawaja Qasim

Al-Sharwani to the post of Wali of Jeddah •.
Sharif Barakat II maintained good relations with the Ottomans.

In

1520 he received Al-.Mahmal AI-Masri led by the Turkish Commander Muslih
Bek, 'Who after settling down, distributed among the people of Mecca,
money and goods which were given away by Sultan Selim I.

Arter the con-

elusion of the Pilgrimage ceremonies in Mecca, Muslih Bek left for
Medina to destribute the same things among the population of Medina.
In 1 520, Sultan Selim I died and, was succeeded by his son SuI tan
Suliman AI-Qanuni (The Magnificent).

Upon hering the news, Sharif

Barakat II sent a message to Sultan Sul1man express1Dg his sorrow f()r
Selim r s death, and congratulating
Sul:iman.
,.

The Sultan replied by con

firming Barakat II and his son Abu-Noumi II in their posts in Al-Hijaz.
in 1524, Sharif Barakat II died and was buried in l·!ecco..

He died

after tuling Mecca as a sole ruler and co-ruler with his father, bro
thers and son for fifty-three years.
II.

SHARIF ABU -N OlJIl11 ,II (1524-1,566)

After the death of Barakat II, the Ashrafs of Mecca elected his
son Abu-Noumi II, who was the co-ruler, to succeed his father to the
Sharifate..

The new Sharif "sent a message to the ottoman, Sultan

Suliman, infonnine him of his father's death and his election and the
SUItan repl ied by confinning his election 11.26
Sharif Abu-Noumi II is considered the great grandfather of the
Banu Baraka tbranch of the Ashrafs.
26AI-Khatib, Ope cit., p.

56.
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He limited the succession to the Sharifate of Hecca in his
line of family. He also set u? reRulations for the relations
between his descendants and punishments if-someone of them
broke out the rer.ulations. 27
His re~ime 't.as known for its stability because he was firm a~ld feared
by the tribesmen and respected by the Ottomans.

In rulinp. AI-Hijaz,

"Sharif Abu-Noumi II ussd as his co-rulers, one at a time. two of his
sons;-- Ahmad and Hasan~.28

Before the period of Abu-Noumi II, the

Sharif of Mecca used to send his men to call upon the pilgrims to re
tumt,o their countries after the end of the

p~lgrimage

ceremonies, but

Abu";'Noumi II changed this policy and many pilgrims decided to stay in
Mecca instead of going back to their home countries" which, resulted in
the increase of the population of Mecca.

The reason for the change of

policy could-be that Abu-NoUln1 thought that. those pilgrimS who' stayed
would help the economic life by establishing trade ties with their
home lands.
The first confrontation between the Ottomans and the local people
took place less than two years after Abu-Noumi II took over.

In 1526

Salman Rei s 29 landed in Jeddah with four 'thousand Turkish soldiers on
their way to. Yemen.

After landing. the soldiers began robbing the peo

pIe,. causing disturbances and demanding more supplies. which c,aused
prices to rise.

Some of the soldiers left for Mecca where they forced

people from their houses., This angered the Beduins because the expelled
owners were originally Beduins.

The tribesmen'began attacking and kill

ing the soldiers outside of the towns.
,27Al-Siba ti,

OPe

Abu-Noumi interfe·red and pre

c'it., pp. 238-239.

281'Q.id ., P. 239.

'29 AI-Khatib, 2.12.t.. cit., p.

d

:.JV.
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vented the Beduins from killing the soldiers.

The people of !J;'ecca

COTn

plained to a certain Shay't<h named l-fohamad Bin 'Irak30 ,. who called the
leaders of the soldiers to the Great Mosque and demanded an explanation
of their behavior.

The leaders claimed that they were going to leave

after'the Pilr.;ri:m:age season. "The Shaykh ordered them to leave 11ecca to
Mina, and to execute the so19iers causing the troUble'.

Then Commander

SalmanReis took for himself the, dues of the custom of Jeddah, which was
reported to be "90,000 golden dinars in that yearn.3 1
DUring this period of disturbances, two uncles of Sharif AbuNoumi II rebelled against his rule and ,sought the cooperation of Salman
Reis, who refused.

Abu-Noumi II sent a small expedition to arrest them,

but a certain commander named Jouhar AI-Maghribi32 mediated and the reI>,

bellionended peacefully.

The Sharif did not make the pilgriri:age that

year t instead he kept ,a watchful eye to prevent fighting between the
Beduins and Salman I s forces.

When the Pilgrimage ceremonies concluded,

the.. Turkish forces left for Yemen.

This period of disturbance "was long

afterward remembered and called the 'year of Salman', the name of the
Turkish Commander.")3
In 153?-1538,Abu-Noumi II led his amy into Jizan, south of Al

.

Hijaz, occupied it and appointed his own

ruler. 34

But in the following

30
'
Ibid., p. 57.
31Ibid., ~. 58.
32
'
Ib'=.<!. , ,p.

58.

33Gerald De Gaury~ Rulers of Mecca (London. Great Britain:
p. 128.
,.34AI-Khatib,

OPe

cit., p. 59.

1951)

J4
year~

.1539, the Turkish Commander Suliman Pasha AI-Khad im na!'Js8d throur:h

Ji7.nn, retunlinp: from Yemen and forced the Sharif's renresentative out,
and A.nDointed a Turkish ruler.

Al:"Khadi'1l and his troops cnmned in Jeddnh

and stayed waitinp; for the Pil grimage season.

During their stay, Al-

Khadim and his forces behaved badly and showed little respect for the
Holy City.

After the

co~clusion

of Pilgrimage ,ceremonies, Al-Khadim

and his forCes left for Istanbul, and with them went Ahu-Noumi' s son
Ahmad. who was well received by Sultan Suliman, and was appointed as
a co-ruler with his father.

Later Ahmad d,ied, and the other son, Hasan,

served ,as a co-ruler with Abu-Noumi II.
In the year 1541, the ·Portuguese attacks increased in the Red Sea,
but failed to land at Jeddah because of its strOng walls and defenders,
although th ey ,
succeeded in landing at a small port called Abu AI-Dawa'ir
near Jeddah. Abu-Noumi II left the Pilgrimage and called
for Jihad (Holy War) among the people who answered in great
numbers. After anning them, he led them to Abu Al~Dawa 'ir
and succeeded in expelling the Portuguese. Sultan Suliman
reacted to the news by sending more bounty and 'confirmed
the Sharif's right of half the custom dues of Jeddah.35
In 15$}, the Turkish ItAmir Al..:.Hajrr Mahmoud Pasha arrived in }fecca
to lead the Pilgrims.
Because he vlas, not well received by Abu-Noumi II a few
years earlier, he started disturbances and called for the
dethroning of Abu-Noumi. Fighting broke out between the
Turkish forces and Abu-Noumi I s in Mina. The Beduins took
advantage of the situation and began attacking the pilgrims
which disturbed the Pilgrimage Ceremonies.' Abu-Noumi led
his fo~gs and defeated the Beduins and the Turkish
forces. j
35rbid.,
--- Pp. 69-70.
~

36Al-Siba' i, 2£•• cit., PP. 239-240.

35
It. is not clear how Sultan SuI1man received the true facts of the inci
dent, but it. could be assumed that either the Turkish judge in Mecca
or Shaykh AI-Haram

~-Makki

reported to the SUltan.

As a result it is

reported that lithe Sultan wrote to Sharif' Abu-Noumi apologizing for
J.1:ahmoud Pasha's behavior and indicated tha.t the Pasha was punished. n37
In. 1552, the Sharif of Medina, Mani', stopped customary payments
to some Ashrafs and tribes of the area aroWld Medma, which made them
angry and they dec ided to force the contmuation of the payments.

It

is reported that
they waited until the pilgrimS trom Medina reached a small
village called AI-Firaish on their way to Mecca and engaged
them in a battle called the "Waqi t at of Al-Fira:Lsh." The
Midinise included the Turkish Judge of Medina and Shaykh
AI-Harem AI-Madani who mediated and promised the restora
tion of their payments. The outlaws let the Medinese con
tinue to Mecca where they informed the Sharif of the in
cident. The Sharif sent strong guards to protect them on
their way back to Medina. 38
.
Regarding the mentioned incidents, it can ·be noticed clearly that
all of them occurred during the Pilgrimage season when Mecca usually
would be overcrowded and it would be difficult to keep law 'and order.
The religious duty of performing the pilgr:image was used by the Turks
as a reason to stay and create problems in Mecca by seizing supplies
or attacking people's properties.
haved this way.
.Holy places.

However, not all Turkish forces be

Sane behaved well and showed greater respect to the

Such forces as the forces led by Sinan Pasha in 1.569 were

among these.
Besides trying to keep matters under control, Sharif Abu-Noumi II
37
.
Ibid., p•. ~O •.
38Ahmad Al-Baradi r i,. Al-Madinah Al-MWlawarah 'Ibr Al-Tarikl'L.A;l
l;g.ami (Beirut, I.e bulon: 1972), pp•. 126-127.

devoted his time to improving the conditions in Mecca by building alms
houses, pilgrim Khans, schools and courts, and water channels between
the hills and Mecca.

In order to do that he was greatly helped by the

Sultan's bounty and his right to half of the custom dues of Jeddah •
. liThe Sharif's reputation for sanctity and good work grew and his style
became the

1

Star of Religion f or Najm Al-Din". 39

In 1,566, because of old age and bad health, Sharif Abu-Noumi II
asked 'the SuItan's pennission ,to retire from his office and to appoint
his son Hasan, then co-ruler, to become theShaJ;'if.

The Sultan agreed

and AbU-N'oumi II devoted his time to religious studies.' His son, how
ever, continued seeldng his advice until Abu-Noumi,. II died in the year
1 584, and was buried in Mecca.

III.

SHARIF HASAN (1 566-1602)

In 1566 Abu-Noumi II asked the ottoman Sultan SUliman to replace
him with his son Hasan and the Sultan agreed.

Sharif Hasan received

the customary KhilfaAl-SUltaniyah and the letter of confinnation was
read in the Great l-1osque, as was the custom.
Sharif Hasan's period was considered an extension of Abu-Noumi f s.
It was a pe nod of stability and there is no record of disturbances
such as the ones durjng Abu-Noumi f 5 period.

He showed a finnness in

dealing with the Beduins and it is reported that the Beduins, because of
their' fear of Hasan

II

would swear falsely by anyone or anything except

the name of Sharif Hasan. rt40

. 39De Gaury,

-.

op cit., l'.

4Orbid.,. p. 32.

131.
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However,' Starif Hasan was very stem with the Ashrafs who were try
ing to gain from their social position

1n the Meccan society. It is

also reported that. because of the established law and order, "com

me.rci~l caravans traveled without being accompanied by a guard. ,,41
In

t~e

year 1.580, ,Sharif Hasan led his army of1 0, 000 men :into the

Highlands of N'ejd and besieged Mi 'kal in Nejd42 •

After a long success

ful exped'ition, he returned wealthier and accompanied by some captured
chiefs.

He kept the captured chiefs in his jail for a year and re
He also appo:1nted

leased them after they paid the money he wanted.
.

,

Mohamad Bin Al-Faddl43 as their Amir (pr:1nce of chief).' The Ottomans
didn~t

interfere or oppose the Sharif's expedition in Nejd, but con

tinued to oppose any Sharif's advances into Jizan south of Taif without
any given reason except that the Ottomans felt that they could control
the coastal area but not the tribal-controlled inland areas.
As it ,became the custom of the Ashrafs, Sharif Hasan tried to
gain recognition of his eldest son Mas loud as his co-partner in ruling
Mecca; but Hasan's brother, Thaqabah, opposed such a move because he
wanted the position for himself.

The problanwas solved when the two,

Mas loud and Thaqabah, died and Sharif Hasan received confirmation from

.

the Sultan to appoint his son Abu-Talib as the co-ruler.
In the year 1581, Sharif Hasan led his army into Nejd because the
local chiefs broke down earlier agreEments.

He succeeded in defeating

them and entered such towns and fortresses as Al-Kharj, Al-Badi f, AJ.
41Al_Sibafi,

o~. cit., p. 242.

4~bid.,

p. 243.

43rbid"

p. 243.

-
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Salmiyah and 'Al-Amamiyah and appointed his own men to rule them. ''"'Nhen
his spies informed him that the Bani Khalid tribe of Al-Hasa was pre-,
paring to fight him, he marched to 'meet than midway between Nejd and
Al-Hasa and defeated them. lI44

Sharif Hasan also partioipated in other

expeditions to .other areas either to punish a chief or to expand his
Sharifate.
In the year 1.585, the keeper of Al-Ka 'ba IS key, Abdu1-Wahid A1-'
Sha'ibi45 opened Al-Ka 'ba for the pilgrims and when he wanted to olose
it he did not find the golden key.

The gates of the Great Mosque were

ordered to be olosed and the people were searched, but with no result.
A

fevl

months later "Sinan Pasha, Governor of

Ye~en

found the key with

a Persian in Yemen, oroered him to be killed and returned the key to
".

. its, keeper. 1146 The Pers1an.l:saotion oould be the result of the exist
ing bad relation between the SUnniottoman and the Shi1i Safavids of
Persia.
In the year 1601, Sharif Hasan appointed
Al-Haddrami47 ,as his vizir.

1

Abdul-Rahman Bin

I

Atiq

There is no record of any vizir before the

period of Sharif Hasan, so it could be assumed that he established this
office, copying the ottoman system to show that his position was equal
to that of the ottoman Sultans.

His vizir, Al-Haddrami, did not prove

44Abdulmalik AI-Makki, Smitt Al-Nojourn Al-'Awa1i
Wa A1-Tawa1i (Cairo, Egypt: no date), p. 370. '
45A1-Siba 1 i, Ope cit., p. 243.

46 Al-Khatib, oR.. cit., p. 114.

47Al~Makki,_oE

cit., p.

382.

Fi Anba' A1-Awa'1
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,to ,have the qualities 'and the characteristics of the important office
he ,occupied..

Al-Haddrami was unfair in treatmg ,the people and became

busy in getting wealthier by using forged documents to take over the
inheritances of dead people.

The subjects could not canplainto the

Sharif Hasan, because the Sharif was under the influence of his vizir.
In 1602, Sharif Hasan

le~

Mecca on his way to ,another expedition

jn

Nejd, but he died in Nejd, and his body was brought back to Mecca to be
buried.
IV.

~Am:F ABU-TAtIB (1602-1604)

When his father Hasan died, Abu-Talib was in Nejd.
in Mecca the, same day the body of his father arrived.

But he arrived

The first thmg

II,

that he did after taking over was to arrest his father's vizir, AlHaddrami, to try him for the crminal acts he committed.

tlAl-Haddrami

committed suicide in jail and the people stoned him until his body was.
buried under stones. 1148
Abu-Thlib IS reign was a short one and he tried to make the people
forget Al-Haddrami's acts which blackened the histor,yof his father's
rule.

Because of Al=Haddrami's story,Abu-Talib never trusted his

vizir and dealt with his subjects directly.
, firmness and became known for his justice.

He treated the outlaws with
In the year 1604, when he

was leading an expedition 1n the area of Biaha, Abu-Talib died and his
body was sent back to Mecca for burial.
V•

SHARIF IDRrS ( 1604-1624 )

When Abu-Talib died in 1604 he did not leave any son to succeed
48Al-Sibali,

OPe

cit.,p. 245.
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him, .and the 'recoros do not show that ht3 had a co-partner in ruling the
Sharifate.

To solve the problem in the customary way, the Ashrafs of

Mecca met and elected Sharif.
brother Abu-Talib.

Idris~

the son of Hasan, to succeed his

The Ashrafs also selected Idris r brother Fuhaid,

and nephew Muhsin to act as co-rulers with Idris.

The results of the

election were sent to t'Qe SUI tans who replied by sending the letter of
confinnation, and the customary Khil fa Al-S1lltaniyah.
The new Sharif was a strong one and had a large personal army of
slaves and Beduins, but his brother Fuhaid had the same' strength and
soon occasional fighting broke out between the two groups.

Earlier,

Sharif Idris disagreed with his nephew Muhsin, ,so the latter left Mecca
for Yemen.

"Both brothers tried to put their men in the important
",

. positions such as the position of Al-Muft.i". 49 They continued fighting,
and disagreements between the two ,brothers influenced Sharif Idris to
ask his nephew to come back as his co-partner.

The return of Muhsin

angered Fuhaid who left to Turkey where he died in 1612-1613.
After establishing his

0'Wll

control in Mecca, Sharif Idris started

sending and leading expeditions into the Highlahds of Nejd.

It is also

reported that "his armies reached near AI-Hasa, where the Turkish vlali
invited them to accept his hospitality, but they declined and re
turned." 50
Back

in JI:Iecca, the Ashrafs became dissatisfied with Sharif Idris'

rule for the following reasons:

1.

Disagreements between Idris

49Ibid.,'P. 247.

50I.~., p. 247.

andMuhsi~.
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2.

Idris 1 dis respect for 1-!uhsin 1 s opinion.

3.

The increased demands of Idris' slaves.

4.

The unfairness of'Idris l vizir Ahmad Bin Younis.

As a re sult 'of the d issa'tisfaction, the Ashrafs led by Sharif Ahmad
declared a revolt to depose Idris and appoint Muhsin, and fighting
broke out in the streets of Mecca.

The position of Sharif Idris became

endangered because of the defeat of his men.

However, he did not show

signs of accept:ing the Ashrafs I demands, but "his sister persuaded
to accept' and he agreed to leave Mecca in two months. n51

h~'1l

He left' Necca

fora. place near the Mount of Shamar in Nejd, where he died tvlO months
later'in 1624.
The revolt of the Ashrafs of Mecca was the first recorded of its
kind

durin~

the period which led to the', fall ofa Sharif.

As it vlas in

dicated, the reasons were to gain more personal advantages by stopping
the growing influence and strength of Idris.

The leader of the revolt,

Sharif Ahmad was a very ambitious manvmose aim was to, gain the position
for himself, lJhich' he did later.

The incident also shows the important

role of the Sharif1s slaves to keep him in power or the opposite.
VI •

SHARIF MUHSIN ( 1624~ 1628 )
,

.

''When Sharif, Idris accepted the demands to step down from the
Sharifates the Ashrafs of Mecca sent a letter to the Porte aSking that
the appointment of Muhsin be confirmed and the Porte agreed by sending
the lettar of confirmation 'and

Al~Khil'a.

Durine the three years' of his reign, Sharif Muhsin was under the'

"51, J:bid.,
.
p. 248.
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influence of the leader of the revolt, ,Sharif Ahmad," who took control of
the government and used Muhsin to achieve his goals.

But, the other

Ashrafs warned Muhs:in of Ahmad I s intentions, so Muhsin took control of '
the governmentbusinoss Which led to disagreement with Ahmad~
In 1627-1628, the new Governor Designate of Yemen, Ahmad Pasha,
arrived in Jeddah.

Because one of his ships with his personal luggage

in it'was wrecked on

a

reef near Jeddah, and sunk in deep water, the

'Pasha sent a message to Sharif Muhsin ask~g him'to send two divers to
'recover his luggage.
After several days' of ,diving "nothing
was recov
. '
.
"

, ered, and Ahmad Pasha believed that Sharif Muhsin had ordered the diver~
not to recover the Pasha's luggage Bothe Pasha hanged the Sharif's
, representatives in Jeddah. 1t.52 ,It is also reported that Sharif' Ahmad
II.

arrived 111 Jeddah at' the t:Une and was thought .to have poisoned the
Pasha ~ s mind.

In any 'case, the Pasha narrested and executed both the

,

,

,Governor' of cJeddah 'and the messenger between him and the Sharif of
Mecca. " 53 ,This' wa~J the first such incident of this kind and it showed
. the weakness of Sharif Muhsin and the beginning of' the q.ecline of the
Sharifate's influence.
Sharif Ahmad wanted to take more advantage from the' Pasha I sanger

.

.

and asked the Pasha fop money and. troops, to depose Muhsin and the Pasha
agreed.

Suddenly the Pasha died in Jeddah, but Ahmad declared 'himself

a Sharif in Jeddah and led Turkish troops to

at~ack

Muhsin in', Mecca.

Sharif Muhsin left. Mecca with an, amy t~ meet Ahmad 15 a,my, "but upon
hearing the news of an uprising in Mecca led by $hari;t' Mas loud, the 'son

52Ibid
' .., , P. 249.

53De Gaury.

OPe

cit., p.'

133.
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of Idris,n54 .Milhsin decided to retum to Mecca.' Muhsin's forces eng.aged
.Has'oud1s forces in Mecca. and Muhsin's men deserted him; so heiled to
Yemen 't'lhere he died in San I a' in 1628.
VII.

SHARIF AHMAD (1628-1629)

After the defeat of Sharif Muhsin t s forces, Sharif Ahmad entered.
~1ecca

with his Turkish forces and declared hblself the Shar,if of Mecca.

He sent

a letter

to the Ottoman Sultan infonnillghim of the changes and

, , the' Sultan replied by

~onfinriing

him in the office.

"

The new Sharif's policy was to gain personal revenge from Sharif
. Muhsin by imprisoning, exiling and killing the supporters of Muhsin in
Mecca.

One of the Meccan personalities. that Ahmad tortured in his jail

.

".

was the M1sttti of Mecca, Shaykh' Abdul-Rahman Al-Murshidi.. It is re
ported that

Shari~

Ahmad tortu,red the Mufti because the

. Mufti unreasonably prevented his (Ahmad's) marriage to one
Sultana B:int 'Ali Shihab. and, moreover, during the ceremony
of. her marriage to another had referred to Ahmad as· a' devil:
lastly f that Ahmad had found, beneath a cushiOn on his
.
predecessor's couch a Fatwa against him by theM-q,fti • .5.5
'After a long torture 'in Ahmad's jail, and because ,of the news of the near
arrival of Amir Al:"Haj,. Ahmad ordered his men to, strangle the Mufti.
Ahmad's polioy di$turbed the peac'e in the d'esert where the tribes
men took advantage of the weak gover-nment and began attacking caravans
and cutt'jng inland routes.

In Mecca itself the soldiers otAhlllad

at~

tacked people's houses, including the houses of sane Ashrafs and some of
,

"

the soldiers entered the Great Mosque with their ·shoes.. At. the same time,

54Al-Si ba ' i, OR. cit." P.' 249 •
.55De Gaury, op, . cit. , p. 133.
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Sharif Ahmad tumed against some of his suppo'rters' and began torturing
them, which frightened Sharif' Mas' oud, who earlier had helped Ahmad to
dethrone Muhsin.·
The news of the 'dis:turbances reached the Porte, which. oroered the
newlY. appointEd Governor of Yemen, Qunsowhpasha 56, who, was on his way
to Yemen, to stop at Mecca and' punish Sharif Ahmad for the mulder of
the Mufti.

The Pasha reached Mecca, pretending that he came to make

the Pilgrimage, and camped outside of'Mecca, where he was joined by
Sharif Mas' oud, who feared for his life from Ahmad.

After the, conclu

sion of the Pilgrimage Ceremonies, Sharif Ahmad went to the 'Pasha's
camp to pay his respect to the Pasha, and the Pasha persuaded him to
I

,enter one of his ten~s to play chessS7, wbere the Pasha's soldiers

-.

caught him.
v~l ted

When the news of his arrest reached .Ahmad r s men, they re

and .fighting broke out between them and the pasha' s army.

To

stop ,the fighting, the Pasha ordered Ahmad to be beheaded, and he
showed the' head to Ahmad I s men, who then
.VITI.

sur~ndered.

'

SHARIF MAS'OUD (1629) .

While the fighting was going on between Ahmad's men and the Pa:;)ha r s,

.

Mas'oud returned to Mecca, took control of it, and declared himself the
new Sharif.

He was a weak and peace-minded Sharif, and Qunsowh Pasha

took advantage of that and punished some, Meccans, and took over their
properties.

The danands of

disappear in Mecca to

hi~

amy caused pr,ices to rise and goods to

The Pasha' also "put his hands on, the custom dues .

. 56rbid~, p. 13:'''

-

.5'7Ibid ., p. 13S.
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of Jeddah and .added all of it to the ottanan, treasury, and thus prevented

the

Sharif from a much needed :income".58

Sharif Mas I oud I s reign was a

short. one, and he d,ied in early 1629.
IX.

SHARtF I,ABDULLAH (1629~16:30 )

, A:rter the death of Mas loud ,the Ashra.fs of Mecca m,et and elected
the old 'Sharif I Abdullah Bin Hasan to the

Sharifat~.

The elected Sharif

.refused to accept at first, but he then agreed :in order to' prevent a war
of succession, and the Ottanan Sultan confirmed' his election in the cus~

, tomary way., His reign was marked by a
a period of bloodshed and disturbances.

stabUi~y

that was needed atter

The new Sharif stayed in office

for one year,', and then decided to ret'1re in favor of his son Muhamad
If,

with

zaid B:in. Muhsin as his co-ruler.
X. SHARIF MUHAMAD (1630-1631)
When the ottoman Sultan replied by confirming Sharif 'Abdullah's

plan of appointing Muhamad and Zaid as co-rulers, 'Abdullah retired and
turned, the Sharifate over to them.

The new Sharif 'Muhamad. oroered the

name of his fath'er. to be'mentioned in the Khuttba 59 • In 1630, "the

peop~e of the' town of Taif I-evolted and killed tlieir ~ariftr60' so
Shar,if Zaid (co-ruler) led an amy which' attacked Taif and put down the
revolt•
. The two co-rulers cooperated with each. other, which bothered some
".

58Al-Sibali, 012, cit. t, p. 262.

59Ibid .,· p. 253.
6O:rbid. ,pp. 253-254.

,',
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of the Ashrafs, who thought that Zaid had no right to be a co-ruler.
They' tried' to tum Muhamad 'aga~st . Zaid to 'dismiss him and appoint one
of his' brothers inst.ead, but Sharif .Muhamad .refused, which cost him the.
loyalty of some of the Ashrafs such as Nami Bin " Abclu1-Mutta1ib.
At that time, the Ottomans were badly de·feated in Yemen, and the
remaining Turks fled Yemen to the north.

'When Nami heard of their ar

riv~ ~ QUnfudhah, he lett Mecca for Qunfudhah, where he succeeded in

persuading the soldiers to join him in attacking Mecca.

The soldiers

marched until ~hey were ~ few mi1e~ from Mecca, and sent to the Sharif
of 'Mecca that they should be permitted tO'enter Mecca.
refused,.

But the Sharif

The 'soldiers marched into Mecca and engaged the army of the

.
61
Turkish Sinjuk of Jeddah
and the Meccan army,' led 'by the two co-rulers,
.

II.

in a battle which became known as Waqi' at Al-Jala1iyah.

The fall of
,

'

Sharif Muhamadin the battle, led to the retreat of ,his army, and to,

the fall of Mecca,1nto the hands of the Turkish soldiers arid Nami.
At the same time, the co-ruler Sharif Zaid fled to the village of
Badr and later to Medina where he began preparations to regain Mecca. '

XI., SHARIF NAMI (1631-1632)
Nami entered Mecca'with the'Turkish soldie~, proclaimed himself
the Sharif, of, Mecca, and appointed his cousin, ' I Abdul-Aziz Bin Idris,
as the co-ruler. ' In the meantime, his friends the Turkish soldiers
looted Mecca, seized food supplies, and, it is reported
between them raped every virgin and every bpy in the city,
those. of gentle birth being the, first, to be seized by the
61De' Gaury, OPe cit., p~ 1)8.
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lustier soldiers of lower grades. For a week they cont'?,nued
forcibly to make the young' of both, sexes drung so with,'
greater facility to indulge their wantonness., 2
Th~

tribes took advantage of the situation, and began to ,revolt

and looted the caravans on the way to Hecca. ' Heanwhile, "Sharif Nami
asked the Sinjuk of Jeddah, Dollar Agha t
refused. ,,63

t<?

surrender

~e

Nami sent h~s 'Co-ruler 'Abdul-Aziz with an army which en

,

,

port, but he

,

tared J eddah, looted

th~

houses and the stores t arrested Dollar A,gha

and expelled him from Jeddah after
XII.

tortu~ng

him.

SHARIF ZAID (1632-1667)

At .the sam,e time, Zaid in Medina sent his cousin with a report to
the Governor of' Egypt, and asked for help to regain Mecca.
,

,~

,

The report

was sent to Sultan Murad IV, who ordered troops to ,be sent to aSSist
Zaid, whom the sU1 tan appointed as. the new Sharif. 'Sharif, Zaid re
ceived 'Al-Khil r a Al-Sultaniyah in Medina and proceded to ytinbu ", to' lead
the ottoman ,forces sent frOD:! Egypt.
',Nami heard the news of ,the' coming troops, so he sent some men to
scout the tro~ps, but, the troops 'captured and killed' some of them and
the rest returned to Mecca and warned Nami.' As a result of their warn
ing, Nami left Mecca with his Turkish friends' for Taraba. ,A lO,cal
Sharif, Ahmad, Bin Katadah,' took control of 'Mecca. and' sent a message to'
Sharif Zaid declaring' Mecca an open city, and

w~ecoming

the pew Sharif.

The follovring day. Zaid entered Mecca.
.

,

After the end of that year's pilgrimage season, Sharif Zaid sent

62-'

,

-'"Ibid., p. '1 39.

63Al-5iba li,op. cit., p. 255.

..,'
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an .amy to Taraba.

The amy besieged Ta~aba for a while ~ captured Nami

and his brother, and brought them to Mecca.

After interrogating them,

. the ··mUlama gave a i'atwa that. the execution of Nami and his brother was

pennitted, so the Sharif ordered both of' them to be hanged. ,,64
"

,

In this paper we are not concerned with the period of Sharif Zaid,
.

,

who ruled, until 1667.

~is

.

'

'

period was a period of stability, and he suc- " .

ceeded in controlling the tribesmen because of" his fimness al}d the
Turkish troops "that were under his command to establish law and order.
He also, succeeded in getting the approval of the Ottoman SUltan' for re
.

~uming

.

to the' Sharif the right to half thecust<ll11 dues of Jeddah" which

Qunsowh Pa,sha cancelled earlier.
,

.

:.,.

';

""

:-/ ......

\'

64Ibid ., p. 2.56.,

,CHAPTER VI
srRUGGLE, FOR SUPRPMACY IN 'THE RED SEA '
. SIXTEENTH CENTURY'
=\= •

RISTOR! CAL .BACKGROUND BEFORE THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY

For nearly a thousand years, the Musl1ms controlled the overland
and sea trade between the

Orien~

and Europe.

Muslim-controlled ships

loaded with products, sailed from the 'Orient ~othe south of the Persian
Gulf', am' f'rom there some ships sailed into the Persian Gulf' up to Basra
in Iraq, where pro,ducts were transported on land to Syria, to be, ex
",

changed f'or products of' the Middle East and of' Europe.

Some ships

sail~d through the Gulf of' Aden into ,the Red 'SEa, and unloaded either

, where they were 'exchanged. ,The trade between 'the Middle East and'
Europe was controlled

by the Venetians. '

The Muslim traders faced many dif'ficulties' suct?- as:

1 ) 'The winds

in the sea, which controlled the sailing and the loading or unloading

ports.
2) The custom dues that the ,tradershacf. to pay at each port :at
, ';'1

which

th~y

stopped.

:3) The BeciuinsWho i'orcedtheir own fees" for letting the products,
pass overland.
Toward 'the end of the fifteenth centurY. the importance, of, th,e

50
, overland routes was reduced because of the following reasons:

1) The

":enmity between the Mamluks of Egypt 'and the Safavids in Persia. ,The
continued threats 9£ 'the Safavids, disturbed the land routes from Basra

to Syria.
2). The weakness of the Mamluks" which gave the Bedums a 'chance
to demand more money.
"

The Muslim ,trad,ers faced the 'gre,atest threat in their monopoly in

'14-98 when the Portuguese Vasco da Gama succeeded in reaching India by
the route of the cape of Good Hope.

And within a decade, the

Portu~

. guese took control of InO,st of the trade, that the Muslims controlled for
,

a long time.

,

The easy sea trade route 'by the cape ,of Goo,d Hope "per

, mitted the Port~guese to sell the goods 'cheaper t'Q'an the Muslim
,
.,'
, trade~s.1I65
'

..

" ,The rivalry of the Muslims and the Portuguese for the ,trade of the
Orient was, not the only
them.

reaso~

for the unfriendly relations between

other important reaspns' were:

1} their different religions;

2) the Portuguese hate for'the Arabs who ruled t1'lem fora, l~ng time;
3) the fall ,of Constantinople into the htIDds of,: the 'Muslims 'in 14-53,

and 4-) the wa~ waged against the'Muslims in North Africa by Spain, ani
.
,Portugal.
,

II.

THE RED SEA IN THE SIXTEENrH CENTURY,

In the year' 1 :J.)O, the Portuguese destroyed the ships of some
Muslim merchants at the port of Calcutta.

The followmg year, the King

of Portugal decided to prevent the Muslims .from getting spices from
65z• .Al41ahas:ini and M. Sharif, Dirasat Tarikhi:vah f1 Al-Nahddah
Al-'Arabiyeh Al-Hadithah(cairo, Egypt: no date), p. 190.
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India by' either paying the Indians 'more for,their gocids, or by destroying,
}tusltm ships.

In 1502,' Portuguese ships seized the port of Kilwa on the

eastern coast of Ai'rica, arid in 1503, another Portuguese fleet was sent

to block the entrance of the Red Sea to all Muslim ships.
wer~

The se acts of war

the Mamluks were faced with.

challenges that the then defenders of Islam, '
:Eht they were in no good position at that ,

tinie' t~ answer because of the' following reasons:

1) the Mamluks were

soldiers not' sailors'; 2) the Mamluks did not have ,~he needed wood to
bu1ld a ,fleet;

:3) the need to import the other needed

m~terials

and

engineers, and 4)' the existing ships of Mu~lim merchants were no match
for the ,Portuguese's.

Because of ,the above reasQls, 'the Malnluks made

attempt to build a fleet.

n~

-,

The success of the Portuguese not only

le~

to hostilities with the

Huslinls, but also led to, the, shift of power and wealth from the European
,

countries on the Mediterranean Sea to the, Western European countries.'
I '

,

The shift affected the· Venetians and the Italians which forced them to
aid the Muslims in the early stages of the struggle, "by Supplying the
~'

,

Mamluks with'woed and engineers.,,66
The Portuguese asked the, Venetians to transfer their business from
Egypt to Lisbon, but the 'venetians found that such a transfer would be
disastrous, so

~hey

refused.

Instead they asked the Mamluk Sultan to

incite the Indian Musl:1lns and to reduce the dues paid in Egypt.

The Si.ll

tan refused, and sent a messenger to, Rome to "threaten ,he would destroy
the Holy places in Jerusalem, ,,67 if the
,

,

66

Portugu~se

contmued to threaten

'
,
Al-Ansari, OPe cit.,. p. 127.

67U .K. Adm'iralty~ 'vestem Arabia' and the Red

Britam: 1946), p. 2,58.

'Sea

(London, Great
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~';uslim

In 1504, the Venetians advised the Mamluk Su.ltan to dig

shins.

\la, canal' from the ~iediterranean to the Red Sea. ,,68

Such a canal would

.

:

have reducErl the value of ,the Portueuese controlled cape of Good Hope
route, but the project never was done, although there are reports
that some d~ggmg was going on in late+,; t·imes.

The inability of the

Harnluk SuItan to anSVler the Portuguese I s threats forced the Venetians
·to withdraw their help

grad~ally.

" In 1505, the Portuguese sailed, into the Red Sea and came up to
Jeddah, the 'POrt of Mecca, but made no

at~empt

to attack it•. This in

cident,alarmed the Mamluk Sultan Al-Ghouri that the holiest Islamic part
was in danger, and so was his own prestige as the protector of'Islrun.
Al-GhQurio:rd.ered a fleet to, be built, and the Venetians supplied him
with the needed

wood~

At the same time, the Portuguese occupied some

important islands and ports in the Indian Ocean, and tried to take
but failed because of its strong

..:~.den,

defenses~

In ,1 507, the new Mamluk fleet sailed to Jeddah under the command
of the new 'Governor of Jeddah, Husayn Al-Kurdi. who upon arrival at Jed
dah built strong fortifications and a strong protecting wall.

The Harn

luk's fleet sailed to India and defeated the Portuguese fleet in the Port .
of Chaul in 1508.

.

But the, Mamluks were badly beaten by the Portuguese in

the battle of Diu in 1509.
Al-Ghouri decided to build anpther fleet, but the Venetians re
fused to supply him ""'ith wood because ,"they were thinking of establish

ine; a

ne't-T

land trade route through Persia and Turke'y."69

So he turned

toward the Ottomans "who supplied him with the needed wood as nell as
68'

Ibic!., p.

258..

69 Anis , '2l2..~ cit •• p. 121.
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,
0
300 capnons. 1f7
In 1509, the Ethiopian Enpress sent Ita messenger to India to sug
'gest to the Portuguese King's viceroy there an alliance against the
Mu~liins. n71 ,The Ethiopians. needed a strong ally to help them against

the Muslim states in Abyssinia Who were aided by the Ma:mluks as 'Well as
by the Ashrafs of Mecoa.

The Ethiopian messenger gave the Portuguese

information about the eastem coast of the Red Sea and retumed hane with
a

~ortuguese

diplanat10 delegation.

In 1509, Albuquerque became the Govemor of Portuguese territories
in Ir;dia and decided to take advantage of the new information obtained

to penetrate the Red Sea since the Mamluks had no fleet to defend it
then.

To get the Portuguese King's approval of such an expedition he
II.

pointed out that:

1) the Muslim Xndianswere depending ,on the Mamluks to

help them expel the Portuguese; 2) the Muslim Shah of Bijabour in India
helped the ~1amluks after their defeat in the battle of Diu, and 3) the
importanc e of occupying Aden to close the entrance of the Red Sea
against Muslim ships.
In 1513. Albuquerque attacked Aden but fa·iled to take it, so he
penetrated the Red Sea in an attempt to reach Jeddah, but he could not
because of the winds.

.

Instead he occupied the Island of Kamaran and at

tacked Adenaggln without success, so he sailed back to India.
,

,

I:q 151'5. the new Mam.luk fleet sailed fran Suez under the' Turkish
commander Salman Al-Rais. With orders to attack the Portuguese posses
sions in India.

In Jeddah, the Govemor AI-Kurdi took over the duties

7O:rbid. " p. 121.
71 Mustaf'a Sal1m. AI-Fath Al-'Uthmani Al-Awal' LU-Yaman (cairo,

Egypt:

1969~. p.

68.
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of the commander of the expedition, and decided to use the fleet to
establish defenses by occupying important islands in the Had Sea and
ports on the Yaneni coast.

The fleet failed to take Aden, but succeeded

in taking the Island of Kamaran , and fortified it.

In 1517, the new Portuguese Governor, Lopo Soares, led a naval
expedition which attacked Aden and forced its ruler to subnit, but in
stead of laridll1g m Aden, he sailed into the Bed Sea and made the first
serious Portuguese attanpt to attack Jeddah.

Soares I adventure was

described in an interestmg way in the chronology of Al-Haddrami, from
which I quote because it gives an idea about the style of Muslim his
torians:

.

Year 923 H (AD 1517): In "this year the Franks, God curse
them, came from India to the port of Aden with thirty sail
.ing vessels, consisting of grabs and galliots, making demon
strations of aid to the people of Aden against the Egyptians,
. and they destroyed nothing in, the harbou-r.. A party of than
c:mn.e ashore, then the Einir Mardjan met them on the coast and
sent a splendid banquet to them at their ships. ·They demand
ed ship-captains (Rubbartin) to go ,dth them to Jeddah, and
the :Emir Mardjan gave them a number of ship-captains, Syrians
against the will of the (said) captains. AlIthia is' (indeed)
enough (to show) the wickedness of the Franks. They then
went on to Jeddah and mooredm its harbour, but the Einir
Salman was there at the head of an army of Turks and others.
They had learned of· his (the Frank's) coming to Jeddah and
were .ready to engage them. However, not one of the Franks
landed on the coast at Jeddah; on the contrary, the Emir .
Salman sought them .ou t in a grabe or two. When he got within.
range of them, he fired at than with his guns, destroymg two.
or three out of their ships. Then the gunner (Madafi'i)
put. something m the powder (barut) so that the.gun went out
of the actions, and the fire burned part of the grabe where
Salman was; it is said that the gunner was' a Christian serv
'. ing with Salman, but Salman executed the gunner and returned
,to Jeddah safe and sound" The Franks removed (tarafa t) from
the port of Jeddah, returning in the direction ot the Yemen.
Then Salman or one 01" his men followed them in a grabe to the
vic inity of Luhaiyah (Ioheia). Then they ~ved front the'
Franks a grabe containing a numver of Franks wan. they brought
back to Jeddah; then they set out w~th them to the Sultan,
the Lord of the Rum. Sane of the Franks went to the port of
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.t\don, and the Emir Hcllujan p:ave them vIator that they ro
nnd r:1nsoll1(.:cl somo. of the prisoners from them.
Thon they returned, unsuccessful,' to Hunnuz, may God
abandon them. 72
.
.
C1id.1T~d,

In 1517 t the Ottomans defeated the Mamluks, and as a result,
they became involved in the struggle in the Red Sea.
were not active at the beg:inning because:

However, they

1) they were busy' on other

frontiers; 2) their nominal control of the Yemeni coast, which was
important in, fonning a defense against the Portuguese, and 3) their
main fleet was located in the Mediterranean Sea.
In 1519, at the, request of Sharif Barakat II, tIthe Governor of
Egypt sent a small fieet n73 which was stationed in Jeddah, while prep
arations started in Suez to build a ,neet.

During the 1517-1520 per

iod, the Portuguese paid more'attention to extending their control
in the Persian Gulf area, but they continued to send expeditions
into
in

t~e

th~

Red Sea to delay ottoman' naval preparations to gain supremacy

Red Sea.' In 1520, a fleet led by De Sequeira entered the

Red Sea to· land a diplomatic mission on the Ethiopian coast.

After

land1ng the mission, he sailed to attaok Jeddah, but the winds and the
military readiness in Jeddahforced him to change his mind and return
to India.
In 1523, another expedition was sent to bring back the Portuguese
mission in Ethiopia, and on its way back it stopped at Aden where the
local mir, who was reluctant to submit to Ottoman rule, "told Eiter
da Silveira that he would pay tribute if helped against the Turks; a
72Translated by Robert Serjeant, The' Portugp.ese of the S. Arabian
Coast (London, Great Britain I 1963), pp. SO-51. .

73Anis,
.
OPe cit., p. 120.

,56.
ship was left

the~

to exact toll in th'e straits, but the .Sheikh impris

oned 'the crew • n74
In 1526-1527, . the Ottomans sent a fleet to occupy Yemen, but
upon arrivmg in Yemen, a struggle for power took place between the
leaders. 'This struggle caused a delay in the achievement. of this
goal•. When the cooperation between, the. Portuguese and the Ethio;pians
threatened "\::he Red Sea, the Turkish Commander. Mustafa Birim sailed to .
the Island o'f Kamaran, fort.i:t'ied it, . and sailed on to Aden in 1529.·
He besieged Aden, but was defeated by the combined Adani-Portuguese
forCes.

He left Aden,andsucceeded in reaching India, where he

helped the local Shah to defend Diu,' when the Portuguese forces ·attacked
.it, :ill 1 531 •
'

..

153.8, a'large Ottoman neet,

. . In

und~r

the command ,of Sulaiman

Pasha Al~Khadhl, sailed from Suez on its way.to India.

The Commander

fortified the Yaneni coasts and the Island of Kamaran •. Then he sailed
.

.

to Aden, which he took by force.

He hanged its :Emir and burned the

toWn,' . The Ottoman fleet left Aden and went to Diu,.. which it failed to
take after a long siege.

The .f1eetretu~ed after' suffering a defeat

a t the hands of the Portuguese.

.

In 1541, the last Portuguese expedition to the Red' Sea left Goa
under the leade rship of Estevao da Gama.

He landed troops' at Musawa r

and saUed to attack Jeddah,where he succeeded.in landing some of his
men at Abu Al-Dwa'ir,. south of Jeddah.

But the then Shartf Abu-Noumi II

. called for. a Jihad (Crusade) and led a large· amy which forced the Port- .
uguese to depart.
74'

Atter his unsuccesstul.. attack on Jeddah, da Gama

Admiralty,: Opt' .
Cl.t"

p. 260.

;;7
sailed as far as Tur,

011

the Gulf of ,Suez, but he did not meet the Ot,.t,o

man neat and returned -to India.
In 154?, the ,ottoman navigator Firi Rais led a .neet whioh re
,

captu;r:ed Adeli". where an Arab'Shaykh had rebelled and asked for 'Portu
guese help.' In 1551, Piri Rai's

's~iled

'again from Suez to eAvel the

,

,

'Port~guese from the Pe~sian 9'ulf, btithis 'expeditions suffered heavy·
lQsse's, and he wa.s blamed f~r the losses and executed.

The withdrawal

of the,PortugUese from the Bed Sea helped the Ottomans to 3trengthen
their positions there~' and when a religio'Us oivil' war broke out in
Ethiopia, the ottomans 'seized the opportunity Cind took Musawa J and
Sav.;rakin in 1557.

The Ottomans signed a treaty with lI:Emperor Fasilidas

of Ethiopia :who agreed toolose Ethiopian ports to :thePortuguese. u75
If,

Sinoe the 1550 J s, the Ottoman oontrol of the Red Sea was finnly
establisheq"

and Muslim ships oarrying pllgrjzns and goods were able to

reach Jeddah and Suez, inspite of the presence of the Portuguese in the
Indian Ocean.

The Portuguese, concentrated their attention on the Per

sian qulf area and India where they started' fac ing c'OJ!1!petition from
other

~iestem

European powers.

With the disappearance of the Portu

guese threat, the Ottomans, relaxed their'preparations and lost interest
in the Indian:, Ocean.
In the late sixteenth oenture, the British became active in the
Eastern' t,rades against the Portuguese and Dutch. ,In 1608, a British
fleet of the East India company, under ,the c'ommand of Will,iam Keeling,
was ordered to reach Aden to establish .•:{£aoto ry there, but the., ,fleet
gav:e up',at Soootra and

~id

not reaoh Aden. ,Atter.:.;.making the Red Sea

75Anis,Op. cit•• ' p. 131.
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an Ottoman Lake,

and pecause of pressure ,from European powers, British,

French etc., the Ottomans agreed to
Red Sea only up to

~eddah,

~et

European ships sail into· the

where :they were to unload their cargo, even

if it· 't-ras for' Egypt. . The cargo bouna. for Egypt was to be carried on
, ships owned and manned by Muslims.

The Ottomans' "refused pe~ission

.for European ships to land at Suez, and 'transfer its passengers over
.'.

land. 'to Alexandria

jn

'Egypt. 1176

. ,There is no. record of. hQW the Ottomans enforced these regulations,
because the Ottoman fleet was not strong enough to stop a combined
European 'fleet. ,Blt it· could be, assumed that the European interest,
w~s

especially the, British,

not directed 'toward the Red Sea at that

,time, which permitted the' Ottomans to set up ,these regulations.

When

II,

the British bec~emore interested intha', Red Sea, they did not hesi
tate: ,to attack Aderi and' occupy it in the ,early nineteenth century•.

,J,' ,

. , Y',

76
.
.
Al-Mahasini and Shari~. op. cit., p., 196. ,

CHAPTER VII
THE'

(

CONCLU~Qi

I

Loo}(ing back at the period that lasted for 112 years, and through
vThich the Holy lands of Islam passed through experiences, some of which
'A1~Hijaz,

',:were -pleasmg ones, but most of which were unhappy ones.

all

through history was the target of any new Islamic dynasty because of
its' religious,'jmportance.

Every dynasty was only interested in gaining

the title Hami AJ.-Haramin (Protector or. the two Mo'sques), and having
the names.
of '
the ruler mentioned in Al-Khutba.
~

The holder of the title

not ,o~ly gained the loyalty and respect of his Muslim subjects, but also
the respect of the Muslims in

are~s

that were not under his control.

The p,re.;;.Ottoman dynasties did not pay much attention to a 'strQng
defense of the Arabian. Peninsula, and records shoVi' only small garriSOns
stationed here' and 'there.

If those dynasties whose kings orsultans

were not Arabs, thought and managed to control the whole Pen1nsula and
, established strong forts" ~he Muslim world would have be,en able to keep
control, of the trade and to stop the Portuguese threat and other '
European 'threats which followed it later.
Irithe case of the ottomans, their interest In the Middle East
resulted from the successful Hungarian resistance which

halte~

the

Ottoman adv~nces in Eastern' and Central EUrope', besides the rising
Safavid threats. in Persia.

Helped by the weakness of the

~amlUks,.

the

, ottomans overran the Mamluk's Kingdom and q:u1okly acquired the title of

J
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the Protector of Islam, as a result of the subnission of the local 'ruler
of l-iecca.
The ottoman administration did: not help to improve conditions of
, the, Holy lands.

By lea'U':ing matters

~heottomans'

to the local rulers.

did

not help to bring stability, beoause of the struggle 'for power among the
members of the Ashrafs.

The ottomans did not spend enough to j,mprove

the internal oonditioos, and the amount they spent was used for reli
gious reasons ,to lift the prestige of the Sultan, or to pay local lead.-·
ers or tribes that the ottomans faUed completely tooontrol only tem
porarily. '
When the ottomans interfered; they interfered to strengthen their
position, not to improve conditions in the area.
~

The period was 1\111 of
,

.ter'rible inoidents in which Turkish generals: and· s.oldiers acted in a
. <iistasteful way that only showed disrespect for the Holy places and its·
]local and superior rulers.
the .weak

~gulations

The .irregularity and the disrespect showed

that controlled the ottanan armies at that time.

I do not think that only the· Ottomans could be blamed for that'
bad situation; the local rulers should share a part of the blame.

As

it was show in the chapter ·on the local rulers, they personally enjoyed
the revenues oommg :f'roni the Ottoman Sultan, and 'from the custom dues of
Jeddah.

Every9ne was interested in keeping

h~self1n

creasing l1is revenue by raiding nearby areas.

power and, in in

The unwise traditional

system that each Sharif was ·to have his own amy of slaves did not help
to

es~ablish o~er,

instead it caused disorders and bloodshed.. We saw

how the ambitions of Sharif Ahmad led to the fall of two Sharif's and the.
losl:ng of innooent people IS' lives.
During most of the period, t~e' OttOmans' opposed Sharif's expan
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sion' into the area south of Al-Hijaz, but did not interfere against ex
peditions into Nejd..
control the
ficult

1mport~t

tas~of

This policy served' the ottomans enabling than to
and easily defended'. coastal area, while the dif-.·

controlling the desert was lett to the Ashrafs.

At that

same tiMe, the Ashrafs" actio~s coUld'be considered as attempts to
establish a ~ynasty :in. the Arabian Peninsula, as well as to increase
. their own income.
A:3 for the· defense of the Holy lands against. foreign powers, the

Ottomans stationed small troops
strong fortifications of
have

suc~eeded

Jed~ah

Jeddah, and 'if it were not for the

built earlier, the Portuguese would

in reaching the two Holy Cities.

the same policy of not trying
alt~h.ough

j.n

:0

The Ottomans followed

control the whole Arabian

Penin~a,

at that ,time, a greater danger, represented by the Portuguese, .

existed •..
But

r

do: not think that anyone', or at leas't myself, can deny the

, iMportant role the Ottomans played to protect the Holy lands when 'the
danger arose.

AlthoUgh they employed a; small power of theirs, they

succeeded in ending the Portuguese threat, but· they did not try to show

,enoug~ forqe to stop th~,European thre'ats in the S,outh Arabian Coast
and "the Persian Gulf area.
The Holy lands' continued to suffer from the same conditions of
misuses of authorities by ,local rulers, . from tribal raids anclfrom bad
behavior of Turkish offiCials, which' helped

to~::keep

it in an unstable

condition'for a long period.
Wi th the caning of the present Kingdom of Saudi, Arabia, . the,

~oly

lands. began to enjoy a stabUity that they did not enjoy since the early
period of Islam.

For th~ first t:1me, the 1llh~bitants began to enjoy
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having a responsible government whose interest is not to raise ,its pres
tige'in the eyes ot the Musl:1ms,' but also, to improve the over all oon
ditions.

The inore,ased and contmuous activities of. the Saudi govern

ment helped to establish law and to :1mprove
and .sooial aspects ot"lii'e:

i~

theeoonom~c,

eduoational

the Hc;>ly land.s •
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